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ABSTRACT
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003, 2006, 2009) contend that the government is
justified in shaping certain choices of individuals to advance their well-being. In this
paper, I argue that those who are committed to a robust notion of autonomy, which I call
autonomy as authority, have good reason to reject the Sunstein-Thaler (S/T) argument
for libertarian paternalism. I draw from Joseph Raz’s (1990) idea of exclusionary reasons and Daniel Groll’s (2012) conception of autonomy to argue that the S/T argument
for libertarian paternalism fails to respect autonomy. I consider if soft paternalism
could be called upon as a foundation for libertarian paternalism, but argue against this
possibility. I conclude that an adequate defense of libertarian paternalism would need
to directly attack the notion of autonomy as authority, but such an attack has yet to be
mounted by the defenders of libertarian paternalism.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary liberals who identify with Mill’s anti-paternalism in On Liberty tend

to think that paternalism practiced by the state in relation to competent adults is unjustifiable. Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003, 2006, 2009), however, contend that
there is good reason to embrace some types of paternalism to promote the welfare of
individuals. In light of recent research revealing ubiquitous and seemingly unshakable
cognitive biases in individual decision-making, Sunstein and Thaler contend that the
government is justified in shaping certain choices of individuals to advance their wellbeing. Sunstein and Thaler think that their position, which they call “libertarian paternalism,” is defensible even to those who value autonomy. In this thesis, I argue that
those who are committed to a robust notion of autonomy, which I call “autonomy as authority,” have good reason to reject the Sunstein-Thaler (S/T) argument for libertarian
paternalist policies, though their policy recommendations might still be defensible.
There are many possible avenues for defending the S/T policy recommendations.
One such route might be to utilize Joel Feinberg's concept of soft paternalism. According to Feinberg, the soft paternalism position allows that it is morally permissible for the
government to interfere with an individual's self-regarding action if that the action is
substantially nonvoluntary (Feinberg, 1986, p. 12). Building on Feinberg's position, one
might argue that because cognitive biases compromise the voluntariness of certain actions, it is permissible for the government to interfere with individual self-regarding actions when these actions result from a cognitive bias. However, as with the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism, I argue that those who value autonomy have good reason to reject the soft paternalism argument for government institutional remedies for
cognitive biases. Like the S/T argument, the soft paternalist does not give autonomy
the sort of respect it intuitively deserves. Ultimately, I allow that while the libertarian
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paternalism policy recommendations might still be defensible, an adequate defense of
the policies would require a direct attack on autonomy as authority, and such an attack
has yet to be mounted by the defenders of libertarian paternalism.
The thesis will proceed as follows. In Chapter Two, I will explain some of the current debates surrounding the topic of government paternalism, specifically the discourse surrounding the definition of paternalism and the distinction between hard and
soft paternalism, which will lay a foundation for the other chapters. I will also survey
some of the recent responses to libertarian paternalism. In Chapter Three, I will present the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism and present one worry about Sunstein
and Thaler notion of well-being. Chapter Four is devoted to my argument that the S/T
treatment of autonomy counters the strong intuition that the autonomous person has
authority over certain areas of her life. What is problematic about the S/T argument is
that it subordinates the individual’s will to considerations of her well-being. Sunstein
and Thaler provide no good reason to accept the view that considerations of well-being
should be prior to considerations about autonomy, an argument they need to provide
given the strong intuition of autonomy as authority. In Chapter Five, I propose that libertarian paternalism might be defensible if construed as a version of Joel Feinberg’s
notion of soft paternalism. I consider an article by J.D. Trout (2005) as one example of
this strategy. Trout contends that since an individual's capacity to make choices is
compromised by cognitive biases, it is acceptable for the government to institute remedial policies to promote the welfare of those individuals. I present an objection that libertarian paternalists would need to overcome to go this route. In Chapter Five, I conclude that the most promising defense will involve challenging the notion that, in the
case of competent adults, considerations about autonomy should always serve as a
trump over considerations of well-being.
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1.1

THE DEFINITION OF PATERNALISM

Joel Feinberg (1986) captures one aspect of what makes paternalistic behavior
intuitively inappropriate in the case of competent adults. In his description of what he
calls "presumptively benevolent paternalism," Feinberg broadly explains that paternalism involves acting toward individuals in a certain way "'for their own good,' whatever
their wishes in the matter" (1986, p. 5). Paternalistic behavior ultimately amounts to
"treating adults as if they were children … by forcing them to act or forbear in certain
ways" (1986, p. 5) for their own welfare. It is commonly agreed that paternalistic behavior directed toward competent adults involves treating individuals in a degrading way
that disregards their capacity for directing their own lives.
However, though it is widely agreed that paternalistic behavior involves treating
competent adults in a degrading manner, the exact characteristics of a behavior that
qualify it as "paternalistic" is hotly contested among many moral and political philosophers. Standard definitions of paternalism tend to identify three necessary features
that must be present for a particular behavior to be considered "paternalistic: 1) interference in the self-regarding actions of an individual, 2) coercion or a limitation of the
individual's freedom, and 3) a motive to advance the individual's well-being or to avert
harm of the individual. Representing this standard definition, Gerald Dworkin (2010)
argues that "[p]aternalism is the interference of a state or an individual with another
person, against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or protected from harm" (2010, p. 1; c.f. Feinberg, 1986,1 p.
5; Archard, 1990, p. 36-42; Beauchamp, 2010, p. 103). Richard Arneson (1980) utilizes
a similar notion of paternalism in his own definition of paternalistic government policy,
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Feinberg calls this sort of paternalism "presumptively blamable benevolent paternalism."

4
observing that a paternalistic policy is one that involves a restriction on liberty, is done
exclusively out of consideration for the individual's good, and opposes the individual's
present will or "prior commitment" (Arneson, 1980, p. 471). While philosophers debate
the details of the three main components of paternalism (e.g. the nature of coercion, the
distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding action, the nature of legal motives, etc.), they typically assume that the three must be present in a particular behavior
for it to qualify as paternalistic.
Several challenges have recently been issued to the standard criteria that identify a behavior as paternalistic. According to Seana Valentine Shiffrin (2000), the standard criteria offered for paternalism are overly narrow and fail to capture "the driving
force behind our aversion to paternalism" (p. 212). Shiffrin argues that a good definition of paternalism isolates precisely what it is about a particular behavior that strikes
us as disrespectful or impermissible, and can be employed across diverse cases to account for normative reactions. Using a series of hypothetical situations, Shiffrin contends that a behavior need not involve direct interference with the self-regarding actions of an individual or coercion/limitation of freedom for the behavior to qualify as paternalistic. Rather, she argues that the worrisome aspects of paternalism have to do
with the "substitution of judgment" and "the circumvention of an agent's will" (p. 213).
Shiffrin describes the characteristics of paternalism as behavior
(a)

aimed to have (or avoid) an effect on an individual or her sphere of legiti-

mate agency
(b)

that involves the substitution of one person’s judgment or agency for the
individual’s

(c)
within the

directed at the individual’s own interest or matters that legitimately lie
individual’s control
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(d)

undertaken on the grounds that compared to the individual’s judgment or
agency with respect to those interests or other matters, the interferer regards her judgment or agency to be (or likely to be), in some respect, superior to the individual’s.
(Shiffrin, 2000, p. 218)

While Shiffrin's characterization of paternalism might seem unconventional, philosophers like Daniel Groll (2012) and Daniel Scoccia (2012) agree with her that coercion is
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for paternalism.
My aim in this thesis is not to defend or critique a particular definition of paternalism, though I do draw from Daniel Groll (2012) who explicitly identifies with Shiffrin's
approach to paternalism, in my own efforts to better understand why we have good
reason to think that libertarian paternalism is disrespectful to competent adults (2012,
p. 712). Like Shiffrin, I hold that what is most worrisome about a certain behavior identified as paternalistic is the "affirmative disvaluing of the agent" that is seen in the "disrespect for those core capacities or powers of the agents that underwrite and characterize his autonomous agency" (Shiffrin, 2012, p. 220). While I do not explicitly critique
Sunstein and Thaler's use of the term "paternalism,"2 I do argue that their defense of
certain government behavior is disrespectful to autonomous agents, and should therefore be rejected.
1.2

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW PATERNALISM
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler first proposed their idea of libertarian pater-

nalism in a brief paper aimed at encouraging economists to "rethink their views on paternalism" in light of research in behavioral economics (2003, p. 175). Sunstein and
2

Groll (2012) provides a brief critique of the S/T use of "paternalism" (p. 707, ft. note 33). Daniel
Hausman and Brynn Welch (2010) provide a more extensive critique, calling the S/T definition of
paternalism "unsatisfactory" (2010, p. 126), and arguing that the S/T characterization of several
supposed paternalistic behaviors is outright mistaken (2010, p. 127).
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Thaler's initial paper led to two other papers (2003b, 2006), which they recently formed
into a book (2008). Recognizing that the terms "libertarian" and "paternalism" might
immediately strike many as a contradiction in terms, Sunstein and Thaler contend that
their version of paternalism manages to preserve individual autonomy while getting
people to act in ways that promote their own well-being. Though other thinkers have
joined the discussion by proposing their own versions of paternalism in response to
studies on cognitive biases (Camerer et al., 2003; Loewenstein and Haisley, 2008; BentPorath, 2010), Sunstein and Thaler's libertarian paternalism remains one of the more
well-developed theories in the movement, sparking literature that supports their theory
and provides additional defense for its application in the private realm (Maloberti, forthcoming) and literature that rejects libertarian paternalism on both theoretical (Hausman
and Welch, 2010) and practical grounds (Rizzo, 2009).
There are two primary approaches to responding to libertarian paternalism represented in current literature. The first approach is to press Sunstein and Thaler on
their support of paternalism in their theory. This approach includes pushing Sunstein
and Thaler on their definition of paternalism (Hausman and Welch, 2010; Groll, 2012),
questioning whether paternalism is really inevitable in certain situations as Sunstein
and Thaler contend it is (Mitchell, 2005), and arguing that libertarian paternalism fails to
address the worries that plague other paternalistic theories, such as not providing a
bright line for limiting the reach of the government interference in the lives of individuals (Rizzo and Whitman, 2009).
A second approach to Sunstein and Thaler's libertarian paternalism is to question whether their theory actually protects individual autonomy as they contend. Gregory Mitchell, for instance, argues that one problematic element with libertarian paternalism is that in the face of evidence that individuals are quite biased in their choices
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and behavior, Sunstein and Thaler's objective is to promote welfare and not to protect
or promote liberty (2005, pp. 1260-69). Given their objective, Mitchell questions their
commitment to liberty. He writes, "A libertarian approach to choice-framing paternalism would direct the central planner to frame choices in ways that push irrational persons in directions that maximize their liberty or help them retain the greatest degree of
future freedom to contract" (2005, p. 1262). According to Mitchell, libertarian paternalism fails to achieve the "libertarian" part of the title because the preservation and promotion of liberty is a secondary concern behind advancing well-being. Likewise, Daniel
Hausman and Brynn Welch (2010) argue that the sort of liberty that Sunstein and Thaler
protect, i.e. having a range of choices, is much narrower than what most people have in
mind when they contend that liberty is important, i.e. having control over one's own
evaluations and deliberation (2010, p. 128). My own response to libertarian paternalism
is akin to these concerns about whether Sunstein and Thaler are as successful in protecting liberty in their theory as they contend. I briefly consider a problem with their notion of well-being, but the heart of my argument is concerned with whether libertarian
paternalism affords autonomy the sort of respect most people intuitively think it deserves.
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2

LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM, WELLWELL-BEING, AND PREFERENCES
In this chapter I present Sunstein and Thaler's basic argument and consider a

difficulty with interpreting their notion of well-being. Section I explains the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism, and Section II draws attention to a potential problem
with Sunstein and Thaler's presentation of the relationship between preferences and
well-being.
2.1

THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM
According to Sunstein and Thaler, although it is commonly taken for granted that

reason and reflection will lead the individual to make good decisions, empirical studies
reveal a number of cognitive biases that undermine that assumption. Such studies
show, for example, that individuals tend to be unrealistically optimistic about the success of their plans, prefer the status quo even if it is disadvantageous for them, and experience an aversion to loss that leads them to make decisions that go against their
own interests (2009, pp. 31-35). An individual’s choices are even influenced by the way
the options are framed (2009, p. 36). Sunstein and Thaler offer the example of retirement savings behavior as one instance of cognitive biases thwarting well-being (2009,
pp. 105-119). Because individuals tend to stick with the default option when given a set
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of options, if a default employee savings plan requires individuals to “opt-in” to participate in the plan, individuals tend to remain un-enrolled. In contrast, if a workplace
makes enrollment in the plan the default option and then requires employees to “optout” if they do not want to participate, participation in the savings program is significantly higher (2009 p. 112). Also, individuals enrolled in the savings plan tend to save
the default recommended amount even though this amount is often much too low, and
individual aversion to loss leads many people not to increase the amount of their contributions with their pay raises (2009, p. 115). According to Sunstein and Thaler, cognitive biases influence individual deliberation in key areas of people’s lives beyond simply
money matters—including in decisions about eating, choosing a health plan, selecting a
school, and entering a marriage contract. In these areas, individuals tend to make decisions that thwart their well-being, decisions they would not make if they had overcome those biases (2006, p. 234).
Moreover, Sunstein and Thaler contend that government action could, in certain
kinds of cases, negate the bad effects of cognitive biases and increase the chances that
people will make better choices. They point out that the government often presents a
number of options to individuals, for example, as when individuals are given a choice
among several motorist insurance plans (2006, p. 244). The government, though, typically presents these options randomly without any regard for the biases that affect individual choice. Under this random approach, individuals often do not select what is
good for them. Sunstein and Thaler reason that since the government must present
choices in some way, the government might as well “nudge” individuals to make better
selections by setting as the default option the choice that the government thinks is best
for most individuals.
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The government might also nudge individuals by means of what Sunstein and
Thaler call “required active choices” or “mandated choice” (2006, p. 257; 2010, p. 88).
In this type of nudge, no default is given and individuals are forced to decide from options that are presented equally. For instance, in giving students the choice to provide
their addresses for military recruitment purposes, the government might make students
(or their parents) fill out a form indicating whether or not they wanted recruitment literature to be mailed to them. (2010, pp. 88-89). The hope is that individuals will more carefully select an option that is best for them if they must choose from equally presented
options. Yet, Sunstein and Thaler contend that though the mandated choice method
might be the best approach for “emotionally charged” issues like providing information
to the government for its military recruitment efforts, the default method is typically better because it is more effective at shaping the decisions of individuals toward choices
that will promote their well-being (2010, p. 88; 2006, p. 258).
Paternalism is commonly thought of as interference in the self-regarding actions
of an individual against that individual’s will but purportedly justified by a consideration
of her well-being (Dworkin, 2010; cf. Arneson, 1980). Sunstein and Thaler depart from
this standard definition and construe paternalism more broadly as intentional “attempts
to influence the choices of the affected parties in a way that will make choosers better
off” (2006, p. 234; cf 2003, p. 179). As they explain, libertarian paternalism is “paternalistic” because the government is intentionally encouraging individuals to make better
choices than they otherwise would make. (2009, p. 5; 2006, p. 235). Sunstein and
Thaler understand paternalism as a continuum (206, p. 252). At one end of the continuum is non-libertarian paternalism, which involves coercion in that it forecloses an individual’s options by either removing particular options from a choice set or imposing a
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high cost on the individual for making certain choices (2006, p. 253).3 At the other end
of the continuum is libertarian paternalism. Since libertarian paternalism merely involves a structuring of options in the choice set without foreclosing any of the options
or making any options excessively burdensome to choose, they hold that libertarian paternalism is non-coercive.
Sunstein and Thaler contend that libertarian paternalism is consistent with the
libertarian ideal of freedom because it is non-coercive. They contend that libertarian
paternalism is “libertarian” precisely because it is “liberty preserving” (2009, p. 5).
They also agree with anti-paternalists that freedom of choice is important: “Libertarian
paternalists care about freedom; they are skeptical about approaches that prevent
people from going their own way” (2009, p. 199). Insisting on libertarian paternalism’s
freedom-preserving credentials, Sunstein and Thaler claim that “[s]ince no coercion is
involved, we think that some types of paternalism should be acceptable to even the
most ardent libertarian” (2006, p. 236). In libertarian paternalism, if an individual does
not want to go with the government’s default choice, she only has to “opt-out” by selecting one of the other choice options. Most people will go with a default option because of
the cognitive bias toward defaults. However, an individual who wants a different option
only has to put in a small amount of effort to select it. Sunstein and Thaler compare libertarian paternalism to setting up a cafeteria. The cafeteria director can arrange food
options in a way that encourages the clientele to select healthy options without actually
removing the unhealthy options. Intentionally structuring the food choices to encourage certain selections is a paternalistic but non-coercive act because all options are
still available to individuals (2009, pp. 1-4; 2006, pp. 235-6).

3

In the extreme form, the coercion associated with legal paternalism is primarily seen as prohibitive legal pronouncements backed by criminal sanctions. See Joel Feinberg (1986, p. 8).
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Sunstein and Thaler consider libertarian paternalism to be non-coercive in another way, namely, that it does not counter the will of individuals by going against their
currently held preferences. Paternalism is standardly understood to involve opposition
to the will of an individual (Groll, 2012, p. 696, cf. Dworkin, 2010). However, Sunstein
and Thaler argue that since people often lack preferences, or at least well-formed preferences, until the government presents a choice set, the policies of libertarian paternalism to shape the choice set do not violate individual liberty (2006, pp. 235-6, 342).
In order to function, even at the most minimal level, the government makes default rules that influence “preferences and behavior” (2006, p. 243). Revisiting the cafeteria example, it is clear that the cafeteria director must decide how to arrange the
food. Yet, Sunstein and Thaler contend that the director cannot simply guess at what
people would choose based on pre-existing preferences, because individual preferences will be shaped by how the food is presented (2006, p. 236). In shaping how
choices are presented to individuals, the government is actually the starting point of
preference formation. According to Sunstein and Thaler, if people can be significantly
influenced by how choices are shaped, then “their true ‘preferences’ do not formally
exist” prior to the presentation of choices (2006, p. 236). However, if an individual does
happen to have a strong preference for a particular option, she can simply “opt-out” of
the default and select a different option.
The ultimate aim of libertarian paternalism is to advance the well-being of individuals. Sunstein and Thaler think that government policy is a good way to accomplish
this. In response to those who object to paternalism on the grounds that an individual
herself is best equipped to make the optimal decisions for her own life, Sunstein and
Thaler contend that this assumption is false: “people’s choices cannot be reasonably
thought, in all domains, to be the best means of promoting their well-being” (2006, p.
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238). Individuals can mitigate some of the effects of biases through education or seeking expert assistance, but these tools are infrequently used, leaving Sunstein and
Thaler to argue that “delegation and learning are insufficient to ensure that people’s
choices always promote their welfare or that they always choose better than third parties would” (2006, p. 239). It can even be counterproductive to merely provide people
information about their choice options and let them freely choose what they want without shaping the choices. Factors such as fear of knowledge about risks might actually
result in people avoiding deliberation about the risks of choices altogether (2006, p.
251). Because of biases, Sunstein and Thaler write, “it is hopelessly inadequate to say
that when people lack relevant information the best response is to provide it” (2006, p.
250). For these reasons, they argue that libertarian paternalism is more likely to promote an individual’s well-being than merely giving the person options without first shaping them; “[s]o long as people are not choosing perfectly, it is at least possible that
some policy could make them better off by improving their decisions” (2006, p. 235).
Specifically, the S/T argument advocates giving an individual a default option, which will
influence her selection if she lacks a strong preference, but preserve her options if her
preferences are firm.
Sunstein and Thaler contend that “respect for autonomy is adequately accommodated by the libertarian aspect of libertarian paternalism,” namely that libertarian
paternalism is non-coercive in that it does not block or heavily penalize any choice options (2012, p. 237, ft note 1). However, for Sunstein and Thaler, the well-being of individuals is the government’s primary consideration in its deliberation process about how
to act in the lives of competent adults. In the S/T argument, autonomy is valuable depending on the person and whether or not she likes to make decisions. Sunstein and
Thaler admit that “freedom of choice is sometimes an ingredient in welfare,” but they do
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not think that this is the case for everyone (2006, p. 237, ft note 1). While some people
like to select a wine from a wine list or be in charge of their medical decisions, others
find the process of selecting a wine “basically intolerable” and “would prefer their doctors to choose [their medical procedures] for them” (2006, p. 260). According to Sunstein and Thaler, if an individual finds making choices to be “a subjective good,” then
the government has more reason to mandate a choice (2006, p. 260). Yet, ultimately,
the respect given to autonomy is couched in concern for the individual’s overall wellbeing. Autonomy, as considered by the S/T argument, is only one part of an all-thingsconsidered evaluation of an individual’s good.
Sunstein and Thaler recognize that some people think autonomy should be
treated as an end in itself. As they note, “Some of the standard arguments against paternalism rest not on consequences but on autonomy - on a belief that people are entitled to make their own choices even if they err” (2006, p. 237). However, Sunstein and
Thaler reject the idea that the will of individuals should ever be lexically prior to considerations about well-being when individuals lack set preferences. They write: “We do
not disagree with the view that autonomy has claims of its own, but we believe that it
would be fanatical in the settings that we discuss [i.e. in settings in which the government serves as the starting point of the decision process], to treat autonomy, in the
form of freedom of choice, as a kind of trump not to overridden on consequentialist
grounds” (2006, p. 237, ft note 1).
2.2

WELL-BEING AND PREFERENCES
Before turning to address the role of autonomy in libertarian paternalism, which

is the primary concern of this thesis, I think Sunstein and Thaler's understanding of
well-being and its place in their theory deserves some attention. It is difficult to determine exactly what Sunstein and Thaler mean by "well-being," and the elusiveness of this
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concept presents another possible problematic element in the S/T defense. Sunstein
and Thaler defend libertarian paternalism as a means to promoting individual wellbeing. They contend that in shaping individual choices, libertarian paternalism aims "to
avoid random, arbitrary, or harmful effects and to produce a situation that is likely to
promote people's welfare, suitably defined" (2003, p. 175). According to Sunstein and
Thaler, well-being or welfare (they use these terms interchangeably throughout their
work) is different than just the satisfaction of revealed preferences, i.e. what people
seem to want according to their actual choices. In reference to their goal to promote
individual well-being, Sunstein and Thaler note that "we intend 'better off' to be measured as objectively as possible, and we clearly do not always equate revealed preference with welfare" (2003, p. 175). This contention and the other claims of libertarian paternalism presume that (1) individuals do not choose in ways that perfectly promote
their own well-being, and (2) a third party can sometimes do a better job than an individual at promoting that individual's own well-being.
There are two ways to understand the first premise. One interpretation is that
Sustein and Thaler simply mean that individuals do not choose perfectly in that individuals do a less-than-optimal job of connecting means to ends due to cognitive biases.
For example, an individual might prefer to retire with a certain amount of money, but,
although thinking that he is making investment choices that advance this goal, the individual's choices actually thwart its achievement because of cognitive biases. People
tend to be more averse to losing money that they already have than to missing out on
possible gains, a cognitive bias that results in people choosing to "play it safe" when
their investments could be earning more money (Sunstein and Thaler, 2009, pp. 33-4,
122-3). Encumbered by this bias, the individual, though aiming to save a particular
amount of money, will make decisions that ultimately hinder or even thwart his goal.
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According to Sunstein and Thaler, in this situation a third party could make a better decision than the individual because there is an objective standard of means-end thinking.
If the goal is to accumulate a certain amount of savings, there are better and worse
ways to achieve this goal.
On this reading of libertarian paternalism, an individual's well-being is comprised
of achieving those preferences that the individual would have were she to make perfect
means-ends decisions. This seems to suggest that while well-being is comprised of
achieving one's over-arching preferences, like the preference to have a comfortable
retirement, one's well-being can be thwarted by other preferences, like the preference
to be conservative with one's money rather than taking risks. While over-arching preferences are subjective to each individual, there is an objectively better or worse means
to achieving those preferences. Moreover, because of weakness of will, a phenomenon
that Sunstein and Thaler thinks plagues most individuals, people are tempted away
from achieving their preferences. For instance, we might make plans to exercise in the
morning, but when the afternoon comes, we are often tempted away from achieving
what we set out to do (2010, p. 41). Sunstein and Thaler draw from behavioral economics to say that individuals tend to display behavior that is "dynamically inconsistent" in
that people tend to ultimately pursue preferences that differ from their initial preferences (2010, p. 41). Libertarian paternalism would be effective at promoting individual
well-being because the government is able to design policy options that help individuals
overcome their cognitive biases in order to achieve their ultimate end goals. The government figures out what the majority of people want in terms of over-arching preferences and then helps them to achieve that goal (2006, p. 260). On this reading, the
government advances individual well-being through libertarian paternalism by helping
people achieve what they initially prefer before they are hindered by a lack of time to
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research their choices, cognitive biases that skew their understanding of what it takes
to achieve their goals, and weakness of will that leaves many goals unaccomplished
through a lack of motivation.
However, the above interpretation does not seem to capture entirely what
Suntein and Thaler have in mind when they say that individuals do not choose perfectly
to promote their own well-being. The first interpretation seems plausible in examples in
which making choices that promote an individual's ultimate aim are tricky and complicated, as is the case with investing money for the goal of having a comfortable retirement. Investing money is complicated, and it is easy to see how cognitive biases might
lead one astray from accomplishing one's overarching preferences. Yet, Sunstein and
Thaler provide many examples in which it seems that the real issue that they are concerned with is the ultimate aim of individuals. While individuals are susceptible to cognitive biases when selecting the means to achieving overarching preferences, the fundamental problem is that the overarching preferences thwart well-being. Sunstein and
Thaler's argument for libertarian paternalism also lends support for this second interpretation of premise (1), namely that individuals do not choose well to advance their
own well-being because individuals do not always accurately identify what overarching,
or ultimate, preferences they ought to have in order to live well. The issue is not so
much that individuals cannot figure out how to bring about an end that they want,
though this is a problem too, but rather that people choose the wrong ends.
On this second interpretation of premise (1), individuals are hindered by cognitive biases from recognizing and acting on what is really in their own best interest. For
instance, in the cafeteria example Sunstein and Thaler think it is pretty clear that eating
apples will contribute more to well-being than eating Twinkies (2006, p. 236). Because
of cognitive biases, though, people are hindered from recognizing that what is really in
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their best interest is that they eat healthy meals. Likewise, in the example of automatic
enrollment in retirement plans, Sunstein and Thaler think that being part of a retirement
plan is a good action that promotes well-being (2006, p. 241). They argue that if people
were perfect at reasoning and not hindered by a lack of knowledge, they would see that
having a certain amount of money set aside for a retirement is an objectively good
thing. On this account, individuals do not recognize what is really good for them because they are hindered by biases, lack self-control, and have a limited amount of time.
It is permissible for institutions like the government to encourage people through
choice architecture to save money for retirement, invest wisely, eat well, and get exercise because these are all components of individual well-being that people would really
seek after if they could reason perfectly. In libertarian paternalism, there seems to be
specific notion of well-being that can be known and promoted by the government.
A problem arises in Sunstein and Thaler's use of well-being in their argument in
that while they want to limit their commitment to the first interpretation of premise (1),
their argument also relies on the second interpretation of the premise, which has unfavorable implications. On the second interpretation of premise (1), Sunstein and Thaler
are critiquing people's ends rather than just critiquing the means that people typically
select in attempting to achieve their preferred ends. This second interpretation of
premise (1) is importantly different from the first interpretation, but I think it is present
in Sunstein and Thaler's argument for libertarian paternalism. According to the first interpretation, the government is merely helping individuals to get what they really want.
On the second account, the government is identifying what individuals should want because individuals are unable to do this for themselves.
So, on the one hand, Sunstein and Thaler want the concept of well-being to connect with preferences that individuals currently have because they are motivated to
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make the libertarian paternalism's government policies as minimally intrusive in the
lives of individuals as possible. Libertarian paternalism is liberty preserving in that it
does not counter any of the deeply held preferences of individuals. They do not want to
be seen as promoting "officious meddling" with individual preferences (2006, p. 241).
Individuals are not that good at making choices to promote their own well-being. Under
the first interpretation of premise (1), the government is merely helping individuals get
what they already want, which strikes many as permissible government action (c.f.
Feinberg, 1986, p. 19; Arneson, 1980, pp. 471-72). However, on the other hand, the S/T
argument for libertarian paternalism also seems to rely on the idea that there are optimal ends that individuals would want if they could think more clearly about the issues.
These ends are objectively good, though Sunstein and Thaler say nothing about what
makes the ends objectively good or how the government can identify these ends while
particular individuals cannot. In conflating the two views of well-being, Sunstein and
Thaler gloss over many issues that might pose significant problems for their theory, and
that might reveal their theory to permit more intrusive government action that would require a more robust argument for its defense.

3

LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM AND THE AUTONOMOUS PERSON
In this chapter, Section I draws from Daniel Groll’s recent argument that pater-

nalism can violate autonomy even if it is non-coercive. I argue that the treatment of
competent adults licensed by S/T’s libertarian paternalism is intuitively unacceptable.
Section II draws from Joseph Raz’s idea of exclusionary reasons and Groll’s conception
of autonomy to argue that the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism fails to respect
autonomy.
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3.1

PATERNALISM, COERCION, AND THE WILL
Readers of Sunstein and Thaler’s works might find themselves agreeing with the

policy recommendations of libertarian paternalism. Helping people make better
choices in order to live better lives seems like a good idea. Libertarian paternalism appears especially attractive when the stakes are high. If an individual’s life could be
made significantly better through the government’s non-coercive nudges, libertarian
paternalism seems to be a good solution to promoting the well-being of individuals while
also preserving individual autonomy. However, I think there is good reason to question
whether the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism is actually consistent with a commitment to autonomy, as they contend it is. I grant, for the sake of argument, that libertarian paternalism is indeed non-coercive, but I show that even non-coercive paternalism is intuitively problematic.
Daniel Groll (2012) has recently argued against the idea that the distinguishing
mark of impermissible paternalism is coercion. According to Groll, impermissible paternalism is commonly thought of as involving an act against the will of an individual
(2012, p. 696).4 However, he thinks that it is quite intuitive that paternalism can be
problematic even when the individual being acted upon lacks a preference, or a determinate will, about a certain choice or action. Groll provides the example of Ernest, a
competent adult who is in debt (2012, p. 698). Ernest has a good friend Sabina who
could help him, but he has never even thought to seek her help with his money problems. Without consulting Ernest, Sabina has been paying down his debt without giving
any thought as to what Ernest would want her to do. Her primary motive is to do what is
best for Ernest. Groll holds that Sabina is not acting contrary to Ernest’s will. Since
4

While the term ‘will’ plays a central role in Groll’s paper, he never explicitly defines it. At one
point he indicates that he means by will the general power of autonomous choice (2010, p. 694).
At other points, Groll seems to use the term to describe intentionally held preferences. In this
sense, an individual has a will in regard to certain actions or outcomes. I use the term ‘will’ to
refer to the power of autonomous choice, which is manifested by making determinate choices.
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Ernest has never considered Sabina’s help as an option, “he has no will with respect to
the issue” (2012, p. 698). Yet, Groll contends that Sabina’s paternalistic treatment of
Ernest is intuitively problematic; the more secretive she is about her actions, the more
intuitively troubling her behavior is. Even if her actions do not counter Ernest’s will, Sabina’s actions appear to be impermissible because, though Ernest is a competent adult
and this matter is entirely of his concern only, she bypasses Ernest’s will to act out of
concern for his well-being. Ernest’s debt is his (and the creditor’s) business alone,
unless he chooses to make it someone else’s business. When Sabina is deliberating
about how to act to promote Ernest’s well-being in this matter, her primary consideration should be Ernest’s will.
Sunstein and Thaler might respond that Sabina’s behavior is relevantly different
from libertarian paternalism. Unlike Ernest, subjects of libertarian paternalism do not
have a choice made for them. What is significant about the Ernest and Sabina case is
that Sabina acts without giving Ernest any options. In libertarian paternalism’s framework, the individual is the ultimate authority with regard to the actions of others undertaken for her own well-being. Rather than the government bypassing the choices of individual, as Sabina does with respect to Ernest, the government gives individuals a
range of choices and merely arranges the options, ultimately allowing the individual to
freely choose what she wants. Even if the government’s paternalism is secretive in that
individuals are not informed that the government is actively shaping the options it gives
to individuals, an individual can still make any choice she wants from the choice set.
For this reason, Sunstein and Thaler might contend, libertarian paternalism is not problematic like Sabina’s actions.
In response to this possible reply by Sunstein and Thaler, I argue that libertarian
paternalism is still problematic, even though the government gives individuals choices.
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Imagine two roommates: Casey and Merritt. Casey tends to “mindlessly” eat when she
is writing papers for school, gravitating to the most readily available food in the kitchen.
Merritt, who does all the grocery shopping with Casey’s consent, notices that Casey is
not making optimal food choices and that Casey complains about how she feels when
she eats too many chips and sweets. Without consulting Casey, Merritt secretly rearranges the kitchen cupboards so that healthier food is toward the front of all the drawers, with the intention that Casey will make better food selections. She is motivated
only by concern for Casey’s well-being. Merritt is not closing off any of Casey’s options.
He continues to buy sweets and chips. He is merely nudging Casey to make better
choices for her own well-being.
By Sunstein and Thaler’s standards of acceptable paternalism, Merritt’s behavior is entirely permissible. Merritt is not blocking any of Casey’s options. Moreover,
since Merritt does the grocery shopping, essentially serving as the starting point for all
Casey’s food preferences, Merritt’s paternalistic actions do not counter any of Casey’s
deeply held preferences. As Sunstein and Thaler understand coercion, Merritt’s paternalistic actions are non-coercive. Yet, Merritt’s attitude and actions toward Casey, a
competent adult, are intuitively unsettling. The more secretive he is about his actions,
the more unsettling his behavior becomes. We can imagine that were Casey to find out
that Merritt has been secretively trying to influence her eating habits, Casey, a competent adult, would be justifiably irritated or even angry about Merritt’s attitude toward
her and the paternalistic treatment. It would seem that, though Merritt acts noncoercively, by manipulating Casey’s own reasoning biases to influence her actions,
Merritt intends to circumvent Casey’s ability to deliberate and decide for herself. Even
if she typically makes her eating choices mindlessly, she is a competent adult who is
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capable of making decisions about her own well-being. By trying to sidestep Casey’s
will, Merritt fails to give Casey’s will the respect it intuitively deserves.
The above hypothetical cases show that in certain areas of an individual’s life,
competent adults command a certain authority, or dominion of choice. In certain cases,
respecting the will of an autonomous individual entails treating her will as the decisive
consideration when one deliberates about how to act toward that individual. This is the
case whether the individual being acted upon has no choice in the matter, as in Ernest’s
case, or whether the individual has options, as in Casey’s situation. The significant feature that makes paternalism intuitively problematic is how the paternalist actor reasons
about how to treat a competent individual. What this means for libertarian paternalism
is that, even if the government necessarily presents the choice options and does not
block the individual’s choice among those options or coerce the individual in any way,
there are features of the policies recommended by such paternalism that should remain
worrisome to those who are committed to autonomy.
3.2

AUTONOMY, RESPECT, AND EXCLUSIONARY REASONS

In this section, I draw on Daniel Groll and Joseph Raz to give one possible account of the intuition that, in certain matters, the will of competent adults should not be
subordinated to concerns about their well-being. I argue that, for those who hold to
what I call the conception of “autonomy as authority,” libertarian paternalism does not
give the autonomy of individuals the sort of respect we think it deserves.
Daniel Groll (2012) argues that what is so problematic about Sabina’s treatment
of Ernest is that she does not treat Ernest’s will as decisive, or as having dominion,
when considering her actions directed at Ernest’s well-being. Drawing from Joseph
Raz’s idea that some practical reasons carry the force of excluding other reasons from
consideration, Groll argues that in deliberations about cases in which a competent
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adult has the authority as the decision maker, the competent adult’s will should exclude
other considerations in the deliberation process.5 In decisions that pertain to a competent individual’s own well-being, which is an area of concern over which that individual
has authority, the individual’s will should play a structurally decisive role in the deliberations of another party. By “structurally decisive,” Groll means that the will of a competent person “is meant to supplant the reason-giving force of other considerations not
because it outweighs those considerations but because it is meant to silence, or exclude, those other considerations from the practical deliberations of the subject of the
demand” (2012, p. 701). Groll recognizes that competent individuals, who by definition
have a capacity for sound judgment, possess the capacity to make good decisions for
themselves. Yet, he contends that the will has normative authority apart from whether
an individual makes the best decisions for herself. In those situations where the individual has the right to be the decision-maker, the individual’s status as an autonomous
agent is what grounds the authority of her will and its exclusionary force with respect to
what can be done to or for her.
To illustrate his account, Groll gives the case of Bob, a competent adult who
needs surgery for his own well-being. Since Bob is a competent adult, his will is authoritative, or has dominion, meaning that in the matter of deciding whether to undergo
surgery, Bob, and Bob alone, is “the de jure ultimate decision maker” (2012, p. 701).
Bob’s capacity for autonomy grounds authoritative demands in the area of decision
making that pertains to Bob’s health. In her deliberations about how to act regarding
the surgery, the doctor’s primary consideration should be Bob’s will not his well-being:
“The point of an authoritative demand in this context is to render such appeals to what
5

Raz describes an exclusionary reason as a “second-order reason to refrain from acting for
some reason,” with second-order reasons being any reason for an individual “to act for a reason
or to refrain from acting for a reason” (Raz, 1999, p. 39). So, if the will of an individual serves as
an exclusionary reason in a certain case, it is a reason that excludes first-order reasons for an
action, such as considerations about that individual’s overall well-being.

25
is good for Bob, at least on the part of the doctor, irrelevant” (2012, p. 701-2). Groll
imagines the doctor not doing the surgery at Bob’s request, but only because accommodating Bob’s request is important for Bob’s overall well-being, saying something like
“‘I have decided that you should not have the surgery, because you do not want it’”
(2012, p. 707). Were the doctor to reason this way, Groll thinks Bob would be rightfully
upset. Getting the surgery is Bob’s decision to make. The doctor would respect Bob’s
capabilities as an autonomous agent only by making Bob’s will, and not his well-being,
the decisive reason dictating how to act toward and for Bob.
In contrast to Bob, Groll offers the case of Carl, an incompetent person who
needs the same surgery as Bob.6 Unlike Bob, Carl lacks a capacity for deliberation and
so his will is unable to ground authoritative demands. For this reason, it is not disrespectful to Carl’s will to treat it as only “substantially decisive,” i.e., as one part of an allthings-considered evaluation of Carl’s good. As Groll explains, “There can be no inprinciple conflict between Carl’s good and Carl’s will, since Carl’s will cannot ground
practical reasons that have any normative force apart from considerations of his own
good” (2012, p. 706). Groll argues that in considerations about Carl, Carl’s will is just
one factor among many that go into the process of deliberation. If Carl is adamantly
against the surgery, the doctor might forgo the surgery because Carl’s preference is, in
this instance, the constituent of his well-being that provides the strongest practical reason. If Carl is less adamantly against the surgery, other factors may outweigh considerations about his will.

6

Groll does not offer a bright distinction between competent and incompetent persons. A competent individual is someone who has the “cognitive powers” to make decisions for himself. He
imagines Carl as someone who lacks the cognitive powers for his will to be authoritative, but
who has “enough of a picture of how [his] life should go to have autonomy be a constituent part
of [his] well-being” (2012, p. 704).
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Groll emphasizes that the primary feature that makes paternalism impermissible
with respect to competent adults is the practical reasoning of the paternalist actor
(2012, p. 717).7 In particular, one of the reasons that the paternalist actor does not
treat the will of a competent subject as structurally decisive in her considerations is
that she thinks that the subject “fails to exercise [his] capacity for sound judgment” (p.
718). The reasoning that underlies the actions of Bob’s doctor and Ernest’s friend Sabina is that they think Bob and Ernest are failing to make a good self-regarding decision, or at least not as good a decision as Bob’s doctor and Ernest’s friend could make
for them (2012, p. 718). Yet, whether Bob or Ernest make the optimal decision in selfregarding matters is their own business. Respecting the will of a competent adult
means recognizing that the individual’s self-regarding decisions are hers, and hers
alone, to make. Respecting the will involves making it the decisive consideration when
deciding how to act toward that individual in matters regarding her well-being.
While Groll (2012) does not explicitly discuss the S/T argument, his distinction
between treating the will as structurally decisive and treating it as substantially decisive is useful for understanding why libertarian paternalism disrespects the will of individuals, even though it preserves choices and does not counter the preferences of individuals (2012, p. 692). If the government adopted the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism as a basis for policymaking, it would fail to accord the will of competent adults
the respect it intuitively deserves.
Sunstein and Thaler think that the will of competent adults should only be treated
as substantially decisive in the government’s policy deliberations. In the government’s

7

Similar to Groll, Seana Valentine Shiffrin contends that the defining feature of impermissible
paternalism is the motive of an agent to supplant her own judgment for that of another competent individual in a matter that lies within the control of that individual (2000, p. 218). Shiffrin
writes that “[t]he essential motive behind a paternalist act evinces a failure to respect either the
capacity of the agent to judge, the capacity of the agent to act, or the propriety of the agent’s
exerting control over a sphere that is legitimately her domain” (p. 220).
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deliberation process, they make considerations of well-being to be of higher priority
than considerations about the will; “The promotion of well-being should be a principal
goal” of the government (2006, p. 253). This prioritization of considerations is especially apparent in Sunstein and Thaler’s reasons for preferring the default method of
nudging over the mandated choice method. Recall that in the mandated choice
method, an individual’s options are presented in a way that encourages her to deliberate about what choice is really the best for her, hopefully engaging her ability for careful judgment. In contrast, the default method is aimed at utilizing reasoning biases to
increase the likelihood of an individual making a specific decision. Sunstein and Thaler
favor the default method precisely because it is more likely to result in the individual selecting the optimal option. They write that if a certain option likely “promotes people’s
welfare, perhaps [the default method] should be preferred over requiring active
choices” (2006, p. 258). However, while mandated choices are intended to engage an
individual’s abilities for deliberation and judgment, the default method attempts to skirt
these abilities to achieve a specific outcome, i.e. the individual’s well-being. Rather
than supporting a method intended to encourage individuals to deliberate about their
options, Sunstein and Thaler prefer a method intended to manipulate reasoning biases
in order to promote well-being.
Related to this last point, the S/T argument treats the will as only substantially
decisive by treating the value of the will as entirely dependent on its role in well-being.
Again, Sunstein and Thaler think that the mandated choice method is preferable if
“making choices is itself a subjective good” (2006, p. 260). For the most part, though,
they think that individuals typically find “required choices to be a nuisance or worse,”
which Sunstein and Thaler think is good enough reason to offer a default option instead
of a mandated choice (2009, p. 89). In support of this position, the S/T argument offers
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the case of selecting a wine in a restaurant. Some people like to choose their own wine
while others prefer to have someone choose for them. Sunstein and Thaler argue that
this shows that, just by forcing individuals to make their own decisions, mandated options might actually hinder the well-being of those who find selecting an option unpleasant. They explain, “If we ask the waiter to select a good bottle of wine to go with our
dinner, we will not be happy if he says that we should just choose for ourselves” (2009,
p. 246). Because forcing people to make a decision can hinder their well-being, Sunstein and Thaler think that there is good reason to prefer the default method over mandated choice in government policy.
However, selecting a wine in a restaurant is importantly different from the government policy defended by libertarian paternalism. In the wine scenario imagined in
the S/T argument, an individual makes the choice to request the waiter to recommend a
wine. The individual is presented with the option of referring to the wine list, but decides that she would prefer to defer to the recommendation of the waiter. In other
words, the restaurant gives the individual the choice as to whether she would like to
forego choosing for herself. In contrast, in the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism,
when an individual is presented with a default option she is not first given the choice as
to whether she would like to defer to the government’s recommendation. One can
imagine a scenario in which the government gives an individual a mandated choice as
to whether she would like to be offered a default option that the government thinks
would be the optimal choice. But this scenario is importantly different from the default
method defended by the S/T argument. Sunstein and Thaler support the default method
because it is the most effective method for promoting well-being; individuals do not like
to make choices about many matters and the default method minimizes the chances
that individuals will make a sub-optimal choice. To achieve this result, though, the de-
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fault method attempts to bypass the individual engaging in the deliberation process.
Sunstein and Thaler’s primary consideration is not the will of individuals, but their wellbeing. Yet, it seems that the existence of individuals as autonomous beings capable of
deliberation and judgment, whether or not they decide to exercise this capacity, provides a strong practical reason for the government to make considerations about
autonomy the primary principle in making of policy.
Sunstein and Thaler might respond that it is permissible for the government to
prioritize considerations of overall well-being over autonomy because government policy serves as the starting point for individuals to develop a determinate will about their
particular options. There is an importance difference between cases in which individuals have a determinate will about the matter, like Bob does, and cases in which individuals do not have a determinate will, such as Casey and the cafeteria patrons. Bob
has a determinate will about the matter of surgery, indicating a strong preference not to
undergo the surgery. In contrast, Sunstein and Thaler argue that individuals typically
do not have a determinate will with respect to many of the choices given to them by the
government, such as choices in matters like insurance plans or savings contribution
rates. Since the individuals lack a determinate will with regard to the options prior to
receiving them, the government does not disrespect autonomy by prioritizing considerations of well-being over autonomy.
This objection, though, misses the importance of the government’s reasoning in
making policy that concerns the self-regarding choices of individuals. The distinguishing feature that makes paternalism impermissible in regard to competent adults is the
practical reasoning that drives the paternalist actor to substitute her own judgment for
that of a competent adult in a sphere of decision-making over which that adult has authority. What is particularly worrisome is that Sunstein and Thaler’s reasoning makes
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individual well-being the principal consideration over autonomy, reasoning manifested
in their questionable support for the default method of nudging over the forced choice
method. In a recent response to the book Nudge, Daniel Hausman and Brynn Welch
contend that Sunstein and Thaler are essentially advocating manipulation to achieve a
certain result. According to Hausman and Welch, those who defend autonomy typically
think of it as not simply about the cost and number of options, but the "control an individual has over their own evaluations and choices" (2010, p. 128). Sunstein and
Thaler's attempt to shape choices through the default method is essentially taking advantage of people's psychological flaws and seems to diminish individual control over
evaluation and deliberation. Their chief worry, which is akin to my own, is that though
libertarian paternalism is not coercive, “there may be something more insidious about
shaping choices than about open constraint” when the intent is to bypass individual
control over evaluations and deliberation (2010, p. 130). Sunstein and Thaler do not
hide the fact that well-being is their chief concern, but what they miss is the problematic
nature of subordinating the individual’s will to considerations of her well-being through
the manipulation of individual cognitive biases. The government fails to respect individual autonomy when it attempts to bypass the individual’s will, whether the will is determinate or not.

4

SOFT PATERNALISM TO THE RESCUE?
It is worth repeating that the concern of this thesis is not with libertarian pater-

nalism’s policies, but with Sunstein and Thaler’s defense of the policies. Namely, they
think that because libertarian paternalism is non-coercive, it is an acceptable treatment
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of competent adults. They think that by merely preserving freedom of choice, they respect autonomy. Yet, because Sunstein and Thaler prioritize considerations of wellbeing over considerations of autonomy, their defense is unlikely to be persuasive to
those who defend a conception of autonomy as authority. Intuitively, in deliberations
about an individual’s self-regarding actions, the individual’s capacity for rational deliberation should exclude other considerations, like the individual’s well-being. Yet, even
if the S/T defense of libertarian paternalism fails to satisfy those committed to a conception of authoritative autonomy, I think that Sunstein and Thaler’s policy recommendations might be still be defendable.8 In this section, I review a paper by J.D. Trout to
consider a possible soft paternalist defense of libertarian paternalism, but suggest that
ultimately the best defense of libertarian paternalism would involve challenging the notion that autonomously made decisions should always trump concerns about an individual’s well-being.9
4.1

COGNITIVE BIASES AS A VOLUNTARINESS-VITIATING FACTOR
John Stuart Mill argues that there are generally no good reasons for government

paternalism. According to this position, the government, in general, is justified in infringing on individual sovereignty only in order to prevent harm to others who not consent to be harmed (Mill, 1978, p. 9; Feinberg, 1986, p. 3). More recently, liberals building on the work of Joel Feinberg have argued that there is never a good reason for paternalistic legal infringement on personal autonomy even if such infringement is a

8

This is not to rule out that libertarian paternalist policies might be problematic for other reasons. For instance, Mario J. Rizzo (2009) represents the concern that the policies of the sort that
Sunstein and Thaler defend are especially open to expansion and will likely to result in an unacceptable infringement on autonomy.
9
Sunstein and Thaler hint at this line of reasoning, but their unsupported claim that the autonomy-trumps-consequential concerns is “fanatical” is unhelpful at best.
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means to enhancing individual autonomy (Feinberg, 1986, p. 68).10 In Harm to Self,
Feinberg describes government paternalism in criminal law as especially "offensive
morally" because it "invades the realm of personal autonomy where each competent,
responsible, adult human being should reign supreme” (Feinberg, 1986, p. 25). According to Feinberg (1986), concerns about autonomy should take precedence over concerns about wellbeing; valuing personal sovereignty means treating it as a moral trump
that “takes precedence even over [an individual’s] own good” (Feinberg, 1986, p. 61).
Autonomy should be protected and can only be limited when one infringes on the
autonomy of another who does not consent to this infringement.
Feinberg, however, proposes an important modification to the above "hard" antipaternalist position. Following Mill, who allows for outside interference with an individual's choices or actions when the voluntariness of that individual's choice is compromised in some way, Feinberg argues that the government can intervene in individual
choices when an actor is making "dangerous choices that are not truly his own" (1986,
p. 99). Contrasting his position with a more stringent or 'hard' form of anti-paternalism,
Feinberg labels his view as ‘weak’ or ‘soft’ paternalism, saying that, in respect to the
criminal law, “the state has the right to prevent self-regarding harmful conduct ... when

but only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when temporary intervention is necessary to establish whether it is voluntary or not” (Feinberg, 1986, 12).
Feinberg contends that soft paternalism is not really paternalism at all because the in-

10

It is essential to clarify that Feinberg's position on paternalism is limited to concerns about the
justification of the criminal law (1984, 3-4). While many people have applied his notion of soft
paternalism beyond the criminal law, as I do in this thesis, Feinberg is clear that he only intends
his notion of soft paternalism to pertain to understanding the criminal law's moral limits. To acknowledge the distinction between Feinberg's own view and the view that Feinberg's soft paternalism can be used more broadly in discussions about paternalism beyond the criminal law, I will
refer to the conception of soft paternalism used in this thesis as "Feinbergian." Additionally, although I quote Feinberg extensively to explain the basic components of the Feinbergian position,
the reader should keep in mind that Feinberg only intends for these passages to apply to the
criminal law.
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fringement merely protects the individual as though from another individual. Since the
individual might not choose the harm were the individual to be free from “voluntarinessvitiating factors,” Feinberg explains that when an individual’s voluntariness is compromised, “there are grounds for suspecting that [the choice] does not come from his own
will, and might be as alien to him as the choices of someone else” (Feinberg, 1986, 12).
Thus, Feinberg argues that soft paternalism is actually more akin to anti-paternalism
than to paternalism.
Ideally, a voluntary act is rationally chosen with “calmness and deliberateness ...
no distracting or unsettling emotions, no neurotic compulsion, no misunderstanding”
(Feinberg, 1986, 104). Yet, there are many factors that could compromise the rationality of an action. The voluntariness of an act is inversely related to the presence of elements that work to distort rationality. Since the individual might not choose the harm
were the individual free from “voluntariness-vitiating factors,” Feinberg explains that
when an individual’s voluntariness is compromised, “there are grounds for suspecting
that [the choice] does not come from his own will, and might be as alien to him as the
choices of someone else” (Feinberg, 1986, 12). Feinberg contends that when the voluntariness of an act falls below the threshold of “voluntary enough,” the government is
justified in intervening in order to save the individual from self-inflicted harm. In the soft
paternalism framework, when the voluntariness of an act is sufficiently compromised
and the threatened self-harm is great enough, the government is justified in interfering
in the individual’s self-regarding actions.
Given evidence of cognitive biases, it would seem that many of our choices might
not be products of our rational capacity but instead be “choices” that arise apart from
our own will. In light of the ubiquitous and entrenched nature of cognitive biases, J.D.
Trout (2005) argues that we should question whether we should view typical adults as
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possessing the capacity to be competent decision makers. Rather than thinking that
competent adults have a capacity to deliberate, decide, and direct their lives however
they want, whether or not they choose to do so, Trout contends that we should instead
think of humans as bias-ridden creatures who are not all that capable at rationally going
about achieving our considered judgments or implicit long-term goals (2005, pp. 395408). According to Trout, cognitive biases are “systematic and psychologically incorrigible” (2005 p. 421). It is nearly impossible for individuals alone to overcome their cognitive biases even if they want to. Biases are much like a common affliction shared by
all people as a natural condition and “arise independently of the will; they are a factor
external to it” (2005, p. 416). In light of how biases work, Trout argues that the
“choices” people make while under the influence of biases should not be considered as
intentionally chosen (2005, p. 416). Following Trout's reasoning, if cognitive biases are
outside the will and compromise an individual’s ability to make fully informed rational
judgments, then on the Feinbergian soft paternalism account we might say that the
government is justified in substituting its own judgment for that of individuals in order to
protect them from self-inflicted harm they are not really voluntarily choosing.
Sunstein and Thaler indicate a potential amenability of libertarian paternalism to
a Feinbergian soft paternalism justification. They contend at one point that with libertarian paternalism the government is only helping individuals make the decisions they
would otherwise make were they freed from their cognitive hindrances (2006, p. 234).
However, there are several good reasons to think soft paternalism might not serve as
an adequate foundation for libertarian paternalism. First, the government action allowed by soft paternalism is more restricted than what Sunstein and Thaler propose. In
soft paternalism, the government can intervene with self-regarding actions only to protect the individual from harm. Even if it is shown that an individual’s deliberative ca-
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pacities are sufficiently compromised, for the Feinbergian account the risk to the individual must be quite severe before the government is justified in intervening. As
Feinberg notes, “[p]ersons may act as nonvoluntarily as is imaginable and as frequently
as possible, so far as the soft paternalist is concerned, provided no harm is caused
thereby” (1986, p. 118). The harm that Feinberg imagines here is an irrevocable harm
to self like serious injury or death, not merely a failure to make the optimal choice (1986,
p. 118-24). In contrast, the policies of libertarian paternalism are aimed at making the
lives of individuals better. While Sunstein and Thaler consider some choices that might
indirectly lead to harm were the individual to choose unwisely, like selecting a health
insurance plan, it is unlikely that individuals who make the less optimal choice will risk
anything like the level of harm that a Feinbergian imagines is necessary to justify government action in self-regarding choices.
One might then simply reject the Feinbergian view that the government can only
act when an individual, through her sufficiently nonvoluntary choices, risks significant
and irrevocable harm. Instead, one might propose that it is permissible for the government to intervene in self-regarding choices whenever the individual’s autonomy is compromised by cognitive biases. However, if this were the only criterion, the government
would have broad permission to intervene in individual self-regarding choices that defenders of autonomy would resist. Feinberg draws a useful distinction between irrational choices and unreasonable choices. While “rationally” refers to an individual’s
capacity to deliberate and judge, “reasonableness” refers to how people value the
worthwhileness of a choice (1986, p 106). A person could possess the capacity to deliberate and judge and also make decisions that others find to be unreasonable.
Feinberg, following Mill (1978) and Arneson (1980), insists that valuing a thick notion of
autonomy entails giving individuals the space to make choices that others might find
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unreasonable. Yet, if the cognitive biases operate as stealthily as Trout proposes, it is
not always clear when an individual is making a rational but unreasonable choice and
when an individual is making an irrational and unreasonable choice that will result in
unwanted self-harm. Even interviewing an individual to discover the voluntariness of
her choice would not likely clarify how much her choice is really a product of reflective
deliberation or a product of a pernicious bias because biases influence how we view
our own actions. Since irrationality and unreasonableness blur together, if the presence of irrationality is the only criterion that justifies government action in the lives of
individuals, a soft paternalistic approach to cognitive biases might very well allow for
government interference in self-regarding actions that are unreasonable but not irrational. Allowing for this would chip away at the very notion of autonomy that libertarian
paternalists would be trying to preserve by turning to soft paternalism to justify their
policies.
Another promising defense of libertarian paternalism might involve a challenge
to the notion that autonomously made decisions should always trump concerns about
an individual’s well-being. Groll provides some direction in this matter, noting that it is
unclear whether anti-paternalistic intuitions in the case of competent individuals are
right. He asks, “If someone is really going to make a poor choice with respect to his
own well-being, why wouldn’t it be justified to paternalistically intervene just because
he has the (here unexercised) capacity for sound judgment?” (2012, p. 719). Groll contends that responding to this question is a big task that would “involve giving an account of what is valuable about autonomy” (2012, p. 719). While answering this question is beyond the scope of this thesis, I think that there can be a middle course between treating the will as structurally decisive and treating it as substantially decisive.
Defending a middle course would likely involve taking into account considerations
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about the relationship between autonomy and well-being, as well as considerations
about the relationship between the value of autonomy and the value of other goods, like
fairness. This course would need to defend a position concerning when the will is to be
treated as structurally decisive and when other considerations, like well-being or the
threat of harm, might have priority.11
4.2

CONCLUSION
I have shown why those who hold to a notion of autonomy as authority have good

reason to reject the Sunstein and Thaler’s argument for libertarian paternalism.
Though the S/T argument holds that libertarian paternalism respects autonomy because it is non-coercive, paternalism in the case of competent of adults does not have
to involve coercion for it to be problematic. What it is ultimately worrisome about Sunstein and Thaler’s defense is that they think that concerns of well-being have priority
over concerns of autonomy. In making well-being lexically prior to autonomy, Sunstein
and Thaler do not give autonomy the respect it deserves, at least if the conception of
autonomy as authority is accepted. Weak-paternalism might offer one foundation for
libertarian paternalism, though this approach has considerable problems that would
need to be addressed. It seems, then, that an adequate defense of libertarian paternalism would require a direct attack on autonomy as authority, and such an attack is yet to
be forthcoming from the defenders of libertarian paternalism.

11

Russ Shafer-Landau (2005) and Richard Arneson (2005) both offer sketches of positions that
might demonstrate how autonomy can be balanced with other concerns, like self-harm and wellbeing.
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